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WARS AND RUMOURS OF WARS
 On three occasions between 1593 and 1637, the incumbent rulers of Japan gave serious consideration to sending military expeditions against the Span-
ish rulers of the Philippines. None of these proposed invasions ever set sail, but 
an examination of the plans made and the reasons they were not put into effect 
sheds considerable light on Filipino-Japanese relations during the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries. As all three ventures foundered partly because 
of a lack of naval capacity, these little-known schemes also provide important 
information about Japan’s military capabilities at this time in its history.
Spanish colonists first arrived in the Philippines in 1564 as a result of an ex-
pedition from the Americas under Miguel López 
de Legazpi, and on 23 July 1567 in a letter to King 
Philip II, this “very humble and faithful servant 
who kisses your hands and feet” notes that Chinese 
and Japanese came to trade on the larger islands, 
bringing with them “silks, woolens, bells, porce-
lains, perfumes, iron, tin, colored cotton cloths, 
and other small wares.”1 The letter is the first ac-
knowledgement of peaceful encounters between 
the Spanish and the Japanese.
It was not long before there were interactions of 
a very different kind, involving marauding bands 
of wakō, the pirate gangs who were usually per-
ceived to be Japanese even when they included an 
international component. In 1572, Juan de Salcedo 
fought Japanese junks off the coast of Pangasinan 
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and Pablo Carrion drove Japanese pirates from an enclave at the mouth of the 
Cagayan River.2 It is in the accounts of such operations that we find the first 
descriptions in any European language of Japanese military techniques and mar-
tial customs, from death-defying charges to acts of ritual suicide. So impressed 
were the Spanish by these warriors that they began to recruit mercenaries from 
pacified wakō and also from within the expatriate Japanese community. However, 
even though Japanese bravery was recognised and valued, there was a noticeable 
undercurrent of fear that one day these independent-minded warriors might rise 
up against their employers. In its most extreme form, that fear envisaged a local 
uprising in support of an invasion of the Philippines from Japan—an event that 
was by no means a remote possibility.
HIDEYOSHI AND THE PHILIPPINES, 1592–98
The earliest written mention of fears of a Japanese invasion in the broadest sense 
of the word appears in a Memorial to the Council of 1586, in which there is specu-
lation within Manila that the Japanese wakō might have greater ambitions beyond 
mere plunder: they “make a descent almost every year, and, it is said, with the 
intent of colonizing Luçon [Luzon].”3 That never happened, but in 1591 the first 
proper invasion scare began when the Philippines entered the consciousness of 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98). By means of a series of brilliant military cam-
paigns, Hideyoshi had reunified Japan after the chaos of a century of civil war, 
and he now set his mind on overseas expeditions. The addition of the Philippines 
to his megalomaniac aims was credited to a certain “Farandaquiemon [Faranda 
Quiemon]—a Japanese of low extraction,” who induced Hideyoshi “to write in 
a barbarous and arrogant manner to the governor, demanding submission and 
tribute, and threatening to come with a fleet and troops to lay waste the country.”4
Farandaquiemon was a Japanese Christian merchant from Sakai called 
Harada Kiemon. He had visited Manila on several occasions, most recently in 
1591, and, having looked at its defences, he returned to Japan convinced that 
the city could be taken easily.5 Together with his colleague Hasegawa Sōnin, de-
scribed as a “court favourite,” Kiemon persuaded Hideyoshi to write his arrogant 
letter to the governor of the Philippines.6 Hideyoshi’s military strength and his 
unification of Japan had become known in Manila, so the bombastic letter begins 
with a reference to these military triumphs and his miraculous birth that had au-
gured Hideyoshi’s destiny to rule other nations. The threats appeared later in the 
missive: “If an ambassador is not sent, I shall unfurl my banner and send an army 
against that country to conquer it with a multitude of men; so that that country 
will repent at not having sent me an ambassador.”7
The Spanish sent back a reply dated 1 May 1592 that was delivered to Hideyo-
shi by the Dominican friar Juan Cobo. Cobo traveled to Japan with a Chinese 
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Christian called Antonio López, who appears to have been sent as a spy. Cobo and 
López met Hideyoshi at Nagoya Castle, the military base in Kyushu built for the 
invasion of Korea. “Cobo showed the king of Japon [Japan] the kingdoms of our 
king on a globe. He gave this to the king, with the names of the kingdoms written 
in Chinese characters, with the distances between them.”8 Harada Kiemon then 
took personal charge of a second Japanese embassy to Manila. The Japanese del-
egation and Cobo’s embassy left for the Philippines in two separate ships, which 
was fortunate in view of the disaster that would overcome the embassy, because 
Cobo’s ship was wrecked off Taiwan and he died at the hands of aboriginal head-
hunters. Antonio López arrived safely in Japan aboard Harada’s vessel.9
Harada Kiemon began his address to the council in Manila by stating that 
Hideyoshi had laid on a magnificent reception for Juan Cobo because he “knew 
that the Spaniards are a warlike nation.”10 Impressive though Kiemon was, the 
council gave much more attention to debriefing Antonio López, who certainly 
knew how to gather information. On 1 June 1593, López was questioned closely 
under oath about what he had seen and done in Japan, with most of the questions 
relating to his knowledge of any Japanese plans for an attack on the Philippines. 
López said first that he had heard that Hideyoshi had entrusted the conquest to 
“Kunquyn,” which probably refers to Harada Kiemon.11 There was also a possible 
motive, because “[i]n Japon there is universal talk of the abundance of gold in 
this land. On this account, the soldiers are anxious to come here; and are coming, 
as they do not care to go to Core [Korea], which is a poor country.”12 López also 
stated that the Japanese had interrogated him about the military strength of the 
Philippines. He seems to have tried misinformation on that point, even though 
his initial reply had caused some arrogant amusement: “The [Japanese] laughed 
when they heard Antonio say that these islands contained four or five thousand 
Spaniards. They said that the defense of these islands was merely a matter for jest, 
for one hundred of the Japanese were worth two or three hundred of us.”13
López also mentioned that three large ships were being built in Japan, although 
he did not know their purpose, and he warned his hosts that in his opinion the 
Chinese community in Manila could not be trusted.14 López also had overheard 
the Japanese discussing the likelihood of the Philippines being reinforced when 
under attack. “[F]our months are needed to go from Mexico to Luçon,” said 
López, “and on this account but few soldiers could come from Mexico. Japan is 
not more than twenty days’ journey distant, and therefore it would be well for us 
to appreciate this fact.”15 In terms of Harada Kiemon’s personal ambitions, every-
one López had met believed that when the Philippines were conquered he would 
become the governor.16
More interesting details then emerged about the size of the invading army, al-
though the figures were very vague. López heard in “Hunquin’s house” (probably 
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referring to Hasegawa Sōnin) that one hundred thousand would be sent, but 
when López (modifying his earlier figures) told them that the Philippines only 
contained five to six thousand soldiers, of whom no more than three to four 
thousand guarded Manila, the Japanese said that ten thousand would suffice. His 
host later told him that they had decided further that no more than five to six 
thousand men would be needed, conveyed on ten large ships.17
The final point López covered was the invasion route: “[T]hey will come by 
way of Liuteui [the Ryukyu Islands, modern Okinawa Prefecture].”18 An invasion 
route via the Ryukyus and then Taiwan was the sensible one; it avoided open seas 
for the maximum amount of time, and it is only five hundred miles from Taiwan 
to Luzon. This was exactly the route the Japanese chose in World War II, when 
they attacked the Philippines from Taiwan, with additional forces landing farther 
south on Luzon from Amami-Ō-shima.
The threat was sufficiently serious for the Spanish to take specific defensive 
precautions, and López’s information, limited though it was, probably proved 
helpful. A document entitled “Luzon Menaced by Japanese” by Governor Gómez 
Pérez Dasmariñas ordered the citizens to stockpile food and arms. All ships com-
ing from Japan were to be searched. Twenty vessels would be stationed in the 
river below the artillery of the fort, with all other boats being moved upstream. 
The invaders could not then use the latter to build defences, and the seacoast 
would be kept clear for fighting. No ship was to leave without permission lest 
its crew be caught and interrogated, nor should any gold or silver be moved out 
of Manila. It also was recommended that the Japanese residents of Manila be 
moved to a settlement outside the city, and Japanese servants monitored closely.19 
Then a review was held of the available troops, including retired men who still 
held weapons. It was estimated that the defence of Manila alone required one 
thousand men, or six hundred at the least. The latter figure was the one included 
in the document, which implies that six hundred men were all they had. Other 
strongpoints required fewer, and there would be twenty-five soldiers on board 
each of four vessels to guard the coasts. The total strength available to withstand 
a Japanese attack was put at a disappointing 1,517 men, only a quarter of the 
number about which López had told the Japanese in Nagoya. Spanish defenders 
were outnumbered four to one, using his lowest estimate of the invading forces.20
The Philippines remained on high alert for four years after Harada’s visit, and 
during that time the Spanish authorities closely monitored Hideyoshi’s military 
expedition against Korea. It was launched during the summer of 1592 and rapidly 
changed from being a blitzkrieg success to a long and painful retreat. The Korean 
campaign revealed a major Japanese weakness in naval warfare and support, and 
one of the main reasons for Japan’s eventual defeat was that the Korean navy 
severed Japan’s lines of communication between Busan and the Japanese island 
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of Tsushima.21 The encouraging lesson was not wasted on Manila. If Hideyoshi 
could not control the Tsushima Strait, how could he ever contemplate sending an 
invasion fleet as far as Luzon?
As his Korean incursion dragged on, Hideyoshi grew increasingly suspicious 
concerning the activities of Portuguese and Spanish missionaries in Japan. An 
active persecution of Christianity followed, and Japan’s first martyrs died in 
February 1597. One of them, Fray Martin of the Ascension, wrote a letter to the 
governor of the Philippines as he was on his way to his execution. It includes what 
he had heard about Hideyoshi’s intentions toward the Philippines. “It is said that 
next year he will go to Luzon, and that he does not go this year because of being 
busy with the Coreans.”22 Martin also commented on the invasion route, whereby 
“he intends to take the islands of Lequios and Hermosa [Ryukyus and Taiwan], 
throw forces from them into Cagayan, and thence to fall upon Manila, if God 
does not first put a stop to his advance.”23
Manila gave some consideration to a preemptive Spanish occupation of Taiwan 
but, as Fray Martin had envisaged, God put a stop to Hideyoshi’s plans. Hideyoshi 
died in 1598, the troops in Korea were recalled, and no fleet sailed for Manila. A 
Spanish reconnaissance of Taiwan may well have been carried out at this time, but 
no attempt was made to exert control over the island. That had to wait until 1626, 
when the Spanish established Fort San Domingo (modern Keelung).24
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE MATSUKURA FAMILY, 1630–31
Japanese naval weakness would come up again as a crucial factor when an inva-
sion of the Philippines was considered for a second time, in 1630.25 Japan was 
now under the rule of the Tokugawa family.
The persecution of Christians had intensified since the time of Hideyoshi, and 
now the only contact Japanese Christians had with the outside world was a hand-
ful of brave priests who entered Japan secretly. The Japanese authorities believed 
they spread sedition and encouraged disobedience, and most of them came by 
way of Manila, so an invasion of the Philippines would be a heavy-handed way of 
closing the loophole once and for all.26
However, trade between the two countries was acceptable to both sides. Silver 
was an important commodity, and Japanese mines yielded perhaps a third of 
global silver production during the period covered by this article.27 As Antonio 
de Morga wrote, “[I]t is well to keep the king of Japon friendly by this means. For 
if he were not so he would be the greatest enemy that could be feared, on account 
of the number and size of his realms, and the valor of the people therein, who are, 
beyond comparison, the bravest in all India.”28
The 1630 invasion scheme was associated almost completely with a single 
enthusiast: Matsukura Bungo-no-kami Shigemasa (1574–1630), the daimyō 
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(great lord) and notorious tyrant of Shimabara in Hizen Province, whose cruel 
treatment of the people and persecution of Christians is very well recorded.29 The 
Philippines entered Shigemasa’s consciousness in 1624 when two ships belonging 
to the Matsukura were blown off course and ended up on the islands. On return-
ing to Japan, their captains spoke enthusiastically about the considerable mercan-
tile activity that existed between Japan and the Philippines and how Shigemasa 
might be able to gain control of it by means of a military expedition.30 Shigemasa 
took no immediate action, because it would have been without precedent for any 
daimyō to act in such a manner purely on his own initiative, rather than by direc-
tion of the shogun. But then an incident occurred that provided him the opportu-
nity for an authorised expedition to the Philippines—to avenge an insult to Japan.
The affront had its roots in Macao, where in 1622 the Portuguese heroically 
had beaten off a Dutch attack. A handful of Japanese mercenaries had served on 
the Dutch side.31 The attempt caused such alarm in Manila that the Spanish sent 
reinforcements to Macao in case of a renewed incursion. The Spanish troops were 
ordered to stand down in 1624, but instead of sailing straight home to the Philip-
pines their leaders chose to engage in a leisurely piratical expedition.32
Among their targets was Siam, where they preyed on the local freight vessels 
“carrying as merchandise, rice, considerable pepper, and some cloth. The last 
named was much needed by the infantry, who already had no shirts on account 
of the long voyage.”33 One of the ships they attacked and burned belonged to the 
king of Siam, but the Spanish pirates really exceeded their brief when they at-
tacked a Japanese “red seal” ship—an authorised trading vessel. It had been sent 
to Siam by the machidoshiyori (town elder) of Nagasaki, Takaki Sakuzaemon.34
The Spanish account of the affair is very shamefaced; it admits that “[o]ne 
[ship] was Japanese, and carried drugs and merchandise. It was captured in good 
faith, but the justification of this act is being discussed. It is thought that the Japa-
nese will be remunerated for the injury received, as they ought not to have been 
harmed.”35 The most serious aspect of the incident was the appropriation of the 
red seal—an act that amounted to an attack on the shogun’s personal authority.36 
A profound apology subsequently was conveyed to Nagasaki.
No acknowledgement came from the Japanese side, and at its meeting in Ma-
nila on 16 January 1629 the council decided to take the matter no further, while 
minuting four reasons why relations between Spain and Japan were at such a low 
level. The first was that Spanish trade had been embargoed, not for commercial 
reasons, but because of its links to Christianity. The second point was that the 
Japanese had refused to receive any Spanish ambassadors. The third referred to 
the “old time robberies” of the Hideyoshi era and his threats of invasion, a theme 
echoed in the Spaniards’ understanding of the current situation in their fourth 
point: 
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Because . . . the Japanese had news of the richness of these islands, they have always 
tried to conquer them, by endeavoring to get a foothold on the island of Hermosa, in 
order to make it a way-station for the conquest of Luzon. That has caused the gover-
nors of Philipinas to make great expenditures and vast preparations during the past 
few years; and but recently it is learned that discussions of this kind are rife in Japon 
and that their reason for not doing it is not the lack of malice but of power.37
Matsukura Shigemasa possessed both malice and power. He realised the op-
portunity that had fallen into his lap, and he addressed the rōjū (the shogun’s 
senior advisory council) in Edo as follows:
Luzon is governed by the Western country [Spain], and that country in conjunction 
with Namban [Portugal] is ever looking for an opportunity to invade this empire. 
For that reason there is a fear that our country will be disturbed. All who come from 
Spain to Japan touch at Luzon. Therefore if I shall conquer that country with my own 
troops, place my own agents there, and thus destroy the base of the Westerners, this 
country will be secure for years to come. If I be permitted I will cross over to Luzon 
and conquer it. I pray that the vermilion seal of the Great Lord, giving me an estate of 
100,000 koku there, may be granted me.38
To his own desire for territorial expansion and personal wealth Shigemasa 
therefore had added as justification the possibility of invasion of Japan by Spain. 
While holding back from a binding commitment to send Japanese troops to Ma-
nila, the shogun gave Shigemasa permission to investigate it as a potential target 
and to make military preparations. On 14 December 1630, with the cooperation 
of the Nagasaki bugyō (commissioner) Takenaka Umene, Shigemasa sent two 
retainers called Yoshioka Kurōemon and Kimura Gonnojō to Manila to spy out 
the Spanish defences.39 They were disguised as merchants and their cover story 
was that they wished to discuss the development of trade. Each had ten ashigaru 
(foot soldiers) under his command, but during a stormy return crossing all ten 
of Kimura’s men perished.
While they were away, Shigemasa continued his military preparations. The 
paucity of sources for what appears to have been the most serious attempt to 
invade the Philippines is regrettable, although the omissions may indicate simply 
that certain crucial aspects were never considered. All that is known for certain 
is that Shigemasa amassed three thousand bows and muskets for his army.40 As 
these are foot-soldier weapons, one might envisage an additional 1,500 foot-
soldier spearmen and half that number of samurai with noncombatant support 
troops, making the total numbers in Shigemasa’s army about the same as the 
five to six thousand reported by Antonio López in 1593. There is no mention 
of naval support in the very meagre sources, nor is any indication given that 
Shigemasa knew that the important way station of Taiwan had acquired a Span-
ish fort since the time of Hideyoshi. Finally, no consideration was given to the 
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need for artillery against the walls of Manila, but that omission possibly could 
be explained by the fact that Shigemasa was awaiting the arrival of his spies with 
the relevant information.
The men returned to Japan in July 1631. No records of the intelligence they 
brought back with them have survived, but their information is unlikely to have 
been either profound or accurate, because they were a far cry from the ninja of 
Japanese martial fantasy. The authorities on the Philippines knew exactly who 
they were and the real purpose of their visit, as is confirmed by the unsigned 
“Events in Filipinas” of 2 July 1632:
In Japon they are still pricked with the thorn of the ship which some years ago our 
galleons captured and burned on the bar of Sian. To avenge this, notable councils 
have been held in Japon, in order to come and wage war against this land; in order 
beforehand to have it well explored, they sent last year in January two merchant ships, 
under cloak of trade and traffic. Although in Manilla warning of this double object 
had been received, this was not made known; and they were received and regaled as 
ambassadors from the Tono of Arima and Bungo. A ceremonious reception and very 
handsome present were given to them; but the city was put in readiness for whatever 
might happen.41
A separate Jesuit source suggests that a deliberate attempt was made to impress 
on the spies the futility of attempting to take Manila by force. It comes in a report 
sent to Spain on 29 July 1631 by Hernando Pérez. In it he stated unambiguously 
that Yoshioka and Kimura were “sham envoys sent to investigate our situation 
in order to have an easy conquest of our country.” Pérez confirmed that presents 
were given and banquets were held. “However, although on the surface there was 
a warm reception, in reality there was a display of military strength in accordance 
with a situation of war. As the envoys passed through the town the army units 
were lined up from the seashore to the governor’s residence.” Pérez concluded 
that the envoys were “amazed” by what they saw.42 Their undercover mission 
therefore came to nothing.
The mission was nullified anyway by the unexpected death of the invasion 
commander, Matsukura Shigemasa.43 He had died suddenly in a bathhouse in 
Obama while his spies were still in Manila. Murder was suspected.44
THE DUTCH AND THE FINAL INVASION PLANS, 1637
No further considerations were given to an expedition against the Philippines 
for another five years, but while Christian refugees from Japanese persecution 
continued to arrive in Manila, so also continued the much smaller reverse flow 
of secret priests to Japan. The last of the line, Father Sidotti, would arrive in 
Japan in 1708. It may have been only a trickle, but it was enough evidence of 
a continuing Christian problem to ensure that the idea of an invasion of the 
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Philippines rumbled on after Shigemasa’s death. Shigemasa was succeeded by his 
son Matsukura Nagato-no-kami Katsuie, who proved to be as much of a tyrant 
and enemy of Christianity as his father, and it is during Katsuie’s reign as daimyō 
of Shimabara that we encounter the hatching of the final scheme to invade the 
Philippines. Once again there was concern about the lack of Japanese naval 
capacity—a deficiency that possibly could be made up by Japan’s loyal trading 
partners from the Dutch East India Company (the Company).
The instigator of the 1637 invasion plans was neither Matsukura Katsuie nor 
his master, the shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu, even though the Dutch were con-
vinced the shogun was to blame.45 Instead it appears to have been the brainchild 
of the two current bugyō of Nagasaki, Sakakibara Hida-no-kami Toshishige and 
Baba Saburōzaemon Motonao, who hoped thereby to curry favour with their 
superiors. The matter was raised at a meeting held toward the end of September 
1637 with François Caron of the Company.46 Caron long had been insisting that 
all Japanese trade should be shifted from the Portuguese to the Dutch, and one 
plank of his argument had been to contrast the Portuguese willingness to flout 
Japanese laws with the Dutch attitude of docile obedience.47
The bugyō listened respectfully to Caron, then changed the subject to 
help from the loyal Dutch to destroy the Iberian bases of Manila, Macao, and 
Keelung.48 Of these three potential targets, the bugyō believed Manila was the top 
priority because its status as the source of supply for Catholic priests would be the 
best bargaining counter to use with their superiors in Edo when the time came to 
gain official permission to invade.
That was of course essential, but so was an army—and the bugyō were civil-
ian officials, not commanders of samurai. The invading army would have to be 
supplied either by the shogun or by a daimyō, such as Matsukura Katsuie, acting 
on the shogun’s behalf. As for numbers, apparently an expeditionary force of ten 
thousand men was envisaged, although this is only a supposition based on com-
ments made after the expedition had been canceled.49 That figure would have 
been twice the estimated number that Matsukura Shigemasa had planned for 
1630, so other daimyō would have had to be involved as well. The bugyō were, 
however, astute enough to realise that once again naval power would be a seri-
ous weakness, so a guarantee of Dutch naval support would ensure that the army 
could be transported. It also would reduce the costs of the operation, which was 
another positive point to place before the shogun.
The bugyō did not approach the matter as supplicants. Instead they broached 
the subject in an assertive manner by challenging the Dutch to explain why, 
if they had the command of the sea, as they so often claimed, Manila had not 
become theirs already. Was it not also true that they had made an attack on Ma-
cao in 1622 and had been repulsed? Caron replied with a long and not entirely 
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accurate account of the 1622 expedition that sidestepped the reasons for the de-
feat. The inclusion of Japanese mercenaries in the Dutch attacking force was not 
mentioned; the bugyō were unlikely to have heard of it, and the Dutch would not 
have admitted that Japanese were involved on the losing side.50
As for attacking Manila in 1637, it was by then one of the most heavily forti-
fied places in East Asia. Caron had no desire to assault it, nor even to transport 
samurai to do so, and he finished by suggesting meekly that the Dutch were now 
more merchants than soldiers. Besides that, he said, their fleet was already fully 
committed to existing responsibilities. One of the bugyō seemed to accept Caron’s 
excuses, while the other kept shaking his head, but neither was inclined to give 
up. The next day Heizō Ietsugu, the daikan (magistrate) of Nagasaki, presented a 
document for the Dutch to sign that would commit them in no uncertain terms 
to supporting an invasion:
Recently we have understood that the people of Manila are breaking the emperor’s 
prohibitions and are sending priests, who are forbidden in Japan. As a result, they are 
viewed as criminals by Your Honours. If the High Authorities decide to destroy this 
place, the Hollanders, who bring a good number of ships to Japan every year, are al-
ways ready, in time or opportunity, to present our ships and cannon for your service. 
We ask that Your Honours trust and believe that we are, in all matters without excep-
tion, ready to serve Japan.51
The text of the document contained such a firm commitment to act that Caron 
could not have signed it there and then; it would have to be passed up the Com-
pany’s chain of command. The bugyō were not surprised by that response, but be-
fore taking their leave they took pains to remind the Dutch that their reputation 
for loyalty was regarded as akin to the fidelity pledged to the shogun by his own 
daimyō. That point was not lost when the document came to be discussed by the 
Dutch at a higher level, where the choice was clear. They had to decide between 
abandoning their reputation as servants of the shogun, with all the implications 
for trade such a move would have, and the huge dangers of committing men and 
resources to an overseas military expedition that could result in the destruction 
of the Company’s entire fleet. They chose danger, and agreed to convey the Japa-
nese army of invasion to the Philippines on six Dutch vessels.
Dutch support having been pledged, the matter was placed before the sho-
gun, who agreed that the invasion should go ahead. His decision may have been 
influenced by the recent arrival of another group of missionaries from Manila 
under Father Marcello Mastrilli.52 No mention was made of who would supply 
the invading army.
Matsukura Katsuie was the obvious candidate, but he soon became involved in 
a serious development that would sound the death knell for the entire expedition. 
An uprising on the nearby Amakusa Islands quickly spread to the Matsukura 
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territory of Shimabara. The predominantly Christian rebels barricaded them-
selves inside Hara Castle, the dilapidated fortress that Matsukura Katsuie’s father 
had replaced with Shimabara Castle. The quelling of what became known as the 
Shimabara Rebellion soon proved to be beyond the capabilities of Matsukura 
Katsuie. It sucked in all the military resources of the Tokugawa shogunate for well 
over a year, and the Dutch naval support promised so loyally for the Philippines 
expedition was used instead for a reluctant and largely ineffective bombardment 
of the rebel castle.53 There was no spare military capacity for an invasion of the 
Philippines, and even less of a stomach for one.
When the shogun’s advisers reviewed the Shimabara Rebellion a few months 
later, a comparison was drawn between the efforts needed to take flimsy Hara 
Castle and the plans to transport a similar-sized army with similar naval support 
many hundreds of miles through occupied territory to take on the European for-
tifications of Manila. The comment was made that the ten thousand men they had 
earmarked for the Philippine invasion should have been one hundred thousand 
—the number of troops that had to be deployed against Hara to overcome one-
third that many rebels.54 Yet such a calculation was now only an academic point, 
for no further attempt would be made against the Philippines for over three 
hundred years.
The shock caused by the Shimabara Rebellion then brought about the worst 
fears for the remaining Portuguese in Japan: the shogun decided they should 
follow the Jesuits in being deported. With the Sakoku Edict of 1639, all contact 
was cut off from Catholic Europe, and even the loyal Dutch were confined to the 
artificial island of Deshima in Nagasaki Bay.
Of the three schemes for invading the Philippines between 1593 and 1637, the 
vast armies at Hideyoshi’s disposal in his 1593 plan could well have succeeded 
against the meagre garrison of Manila had he not been humiliated already in 
Korea by a woeful lack of naval support. Two seaborne attempts against Taiwan 
in 1609 and 1616 were also failures, and an annexation of the Ryukyus in 1609 
was to be contemporary Japan’s only overseas gain.55 
The 1630 effort against the Philippines was to be led by someone who was 
committed to the scheme, but there was apparently no improvement in the sea-
borne capacity. The chances of success also were reduced because the defences of 
Manila were by then stronger than in 1593 and Taiwan had a Spanish fort on it 
instead of a Japanese one. These points alone may well have led to the cancella-
tion of the project if the Matsukura spies had ever had the chance to report back 
to Shigemasa.
The popular view of the 1637 attempt gives the impression that a fleet was 
ready to set sail and was stopped only by the Shimabara Rebellion, but this does 
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not appear to have been the case. The Dutch made a commitment to provide 
naval support and the shogun approved the scheme, but there is no evidence 
that Matsukura Katsuie was waiting for the go-ahead. It is more than likely that 
the invasion plans had advanced no further than the two Nagasaki officials with 
their ill-informed “back of an envelope” calculations. The subsequent experience 
at Hara Castle then betrayed a huge Japanese deficiency in siege artillery.56 The 
walls of Manila would have been safe even if the Japanese had succeeded in get-
ting beyond fortified Taiwan.
The issue of Japanese naval capacity would not be resolved until the twentieth 
century, so when the Shimabara Rebellion forced the cancellation of the 1637 
Philippines expedition it marked a point in time when Japan turned its back on 
the notion of an overseas empire for three hundred years. As for the problem 
of Christianity, an invasion of the Philippines would have cut off the supply of 
subversive secret priests, but the flow was always only an ideological annoyance, 
never an armed flood. Instead Japan responded to this minor threat by its dra-
matic and fateful decision in 1639 to isolate itself from European nations.
Throughout the decades under discussion, the Spanish took the Japanese 
threats seriously and always responded on the basis of good intelligence. Their 
exposure of Matsukura’s spies shows that their considered response to a notional 
Japanese threat was managed as carefully in 1630 as it had been in 1593. Their 
preparations always involved the monitoring of a potential fifth column of Japa-
nese residents in Manila, but even when brief uprisings occurred, other Japanese 
could be found fighting loyally for their Spanish masters elsewhere, so the Span-
ish never feared any great threat from that quarter. Their defensive actions were 
prompted only by rumours of war, not war itself.
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